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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a decision as surprising as it is significant for the future course of European 
economic integration, the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has-at least for the foreseeable future-vol-
untarily suspended the exercise of a crucial aspect of its jurisdiction. Its land-
mark decision I of October 22, 1986, announces the German Constitutional 
Court's recognition of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as 
the lawful adjudicator of all issues growing out of Community secondary law, 
even where the conflict concerns basic personal rights guaranteed by the Federal 
German Constitution. Through this ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court 
has reversed its own precedent2 of more than a decade's standing and has 
• Professor of Law, Georgia State University. A.B., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 
M.S .. Georgia State University; J.D .. Emory University. 
I Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339 [hereinafter Solange II]. The popular name of the 
decision, Sotange II, is drawn from the introduction to the holding of the Federal Constitutional Court: 
"As long as [Sotange II] the European Communities, especially the decisions of the Court of the 
Communities, generally guarantee an effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sover-
eign power of the Communities .... " Id. at 387 (translated by the author with the assistance of Brigitte 
M. Fessle). 
'Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 540 (1974) [hereinafter 
Sotange fl. This case is popularly named Solange I for the use of the same phrase in the court's decision: 
As long as [Solange] the integration process [in the European Communities] has not progressed 
so far that Community law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a 
parliament and of settled validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of 
fundamental rights contained in the [German] Constitution, a reference by a court in the 
Federal Republic of Germany to the Bundesverfassungsgericht in judicial review proceedings 
[involving conflicts of Community secondary law and fundamental rights under the German 
Basic Law] ... is admissible and necessary .... 
[d. at 285, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 554. At issue in Solange II and its predecessor case was the 
coordination of European Community secondary law with basic rights grounded in the Grundgesetzfilr 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschlan.d, the Federal German Constitution, also known as the Basic Law. European 
Community secondary law consists of those "legal provisions issued by the Community institutions 
within the sphere of competence conferred upon Ulem" by the EEC treaty. See infra note 3. See 
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signaled a new phase in the legal history of European economic coordination 
and integration. 
II. THE FIRST SOLANGE RULING 
Fundamental human rights standards are conspicuously absent from the 
Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community.3 Given the Ger-
man experience in the twentieth century with totalitarian oppression and the 
destruction of the Weimar Constitution under right- and left-wing radicalism 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it is not surprising that widespread debate 
erupted in the Federal Republic of Germany during the 1960s over this "de-
mocracy deficit" in the European Community.4 
An early line of decisions in the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities increased some Germans' fear that the Community would disregard fun-
damental rights guaranteed by the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). For ex-
ample, in Stork v. High Authority5 the European Court emphasized its narrow 
function in interpreting the legal effects of Community instruments. The court 
Judgment of Oct. 18, 1967,22 BVerfGE 293, 296, summarized in 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 483 (1968). 
European Community secondary law includes generally, then, the legislative and regulatory measures 
adopted by the European Community institutions established in the EEC Treaty. The specific types 
of European Community secondary law at issue in Sotange I and II were import and export regulations 
adopted by the Councilor Commission of the Communities. Primary European Community law is. 
on the other hand. the EEC Treaty itself and the obligations contained within its terms. These were 
not in contention in either Sotange I or in Solange II. The Constitutional Court observed that "there is 
at the moment nothing to support the view that rules of the Treaty establishing the EEC. that is. 
primary Community law. could be in conflict with provisions ofthe Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany." Sotange I at 277. 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 548-49. 
Each of these decisions addressed fundamental rights under the Grundgesetz to the exclusion of 
adjectival provisions appearing there. See infra note 25 regarding the enumeration of fundamental 
rights in the Grundgesetz. As the court noted in Solange I. the question of a conflict between Community 
secondary law and "the law of the [German] Constitution outside its catalog of fundamental rights" 
remained open. Solange I at 277. 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 549 (emphasis in the original). 
'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. done at Rome. March 25. 1957. 298 
U.N.T.S. II (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Ulrich Scheuner had suggested the reasons for this 
omission: 
The Treaties instituting the Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Com-
munity do not contain any provisions dealing with human rights. The economic objectives of 
the Treaties did not seem to stir up problems in this field. the more so as they were directed 
towards greater freedom of trade and of personal mobility. Only when the realization of the 
goals of the common market entailed a vast system of economic dirigism. did the question 
arise whether some measures of the Communities would encroach upon the liberties protected 
by national constitutional law. 
U. Scheuner. Fundamental Rights in European Community Law and in National Constitutional Law. 12 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 171 (1975). 
4 For a discussion of the elements and development of this debate. see Scheuner. supra note 3. at 
171-73. 
5 Stork v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 1959 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
17. 
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in that decision deemed itself incapable of either examining directly the national 
constitutional provisions of member states or, by extension, applying them in 
immediate fashion. In Stork it directly disclaimed any authority to apply German 
constitutional rights6 concerning property and economic liberty. The European 
Court continued this self-limiting approach in other decisions such as Sgarlata 
v. EEC Commission,? a case in which "basic principles governing all member 
countries" were at issue. 
These decisions, and the evolving dynamics of Community law, further 
heightened German concern regarding possible intrusions by the Community 
upon constitutionally guaranteed human rights: 
When considerable parts of Community Law came to be regarded 
as directly applicable, demanding immediate application within the 
States, and when supremacy of Community Law was proclaimed by 
the Court, the question became urgent whether the transfer of 
powers to the Community ... include[d] the recognition of the 
primacy of European enactments even over norms of the [German] 
Federal Constitution.s 
6 Stork was concerned with Grundgesetz arts. 12 & 14 (W. Ger.). Article 12 addresses freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession, together with a prohibition against forced labor; article 14 concerns 
the right of property (Eigentum) , inheritance (Erbrecht) and their subjection to condemnation (Enteig-
nung) for the common good. 
A useful English translation of the Grundgesetz is found in Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1981). This translation is used here. 
7 Sgarlata v. Commission of the European Communities, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215. Also 
troubling were the decisions of the European Court in cases such as Prasident Ruhrkolen-Verkaufsge-
sellschaft m.b.H, et al. v. High Aut~ority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1960 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 423, in which the court raised considerable questions regarding its perception of the role 
of human rights within Community law. In these cases, one observer notes: 
[T]he Court refused to recognize fundamental rights as such. Perhaps its reaction is, with 
hindsight, explicable; the issue may have been presented to it in the wrong way. When an 
applicant sought to rely directly on a fundamental right protected by his own law, even by 
his national constitution, the Court reacted by re-asserting the supremacy of Community law 
over the laws, even the constitutional laws, of the Member States. The development of 
Community law had often naturally responded to the way in which a question has been put 
to it, whether by an applicant in a direct action or by a court of a Member State on a reference. 
L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 269 (2d ed. 1983). 
C.j. Mann has suggested a somewhat more institutional basis on which to explain the seeming antipathy 
of the early Court of justice towards issues of human rights, especially when these rested on national 
constitutional bases: 
[T]he power of the Court is limited .... [It] is qualified to determine only certain issues, and 
then often only some one facet of the particular issue in question. For this reason, the Court 
has carefully delineated its jurisdictional authority when challenged .... [T]he extremely 
abstract and truncated reasoning of the Court ... reflects a prudent attempt to avoid poten-
tially embarrassing confrontations between Community and Member State policy. In this way, 
the Court had manifested a keen awareness of the real limits of its power in the development 
of Community law. 
C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 513 (1972). 
H Scheuner, supra note 3, at 172. 
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A formal German response to this question appeared in the 1974 ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Solange /.9 
Solange / resulted in a "clarification," if not the final resolution, "of the 
relationship between the guarantees of fundamental rights in the [Federal 
German] Constitution and the rules of secondary Community law."lo This "clar-
ification" complicated and obscured the coordination of the Community and 
German legal orders until it was, for all practical purposes, put to rest twelve 
years later in the 1986 decision (Solange II) handed down by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court. 
So lange / involved certain aspects of European Council and Commission 
Regulations ll which required, in part, the payment of a bond in conjunction 
with export license applications. The purpose of the bond requirement was to 
secure performance of the obligation to export during the period of license 
validity. The petitioner had forfeited such a bond in a corn flour export trans-
action and protested this result to the administering agency.12 When no relief 
was forthcoming, the company brought suit for a refund in the Administrative 
Court (Verwaltungsgericht) in Frankfurt am Main. 13 The company alleged in the 
suit that the agency had violated its constitutional rights under the Federal 
Republic's Basic Law. 14 
9 Solange I, supra note 2. 
10 ld. at 277, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 548. 
11 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 120/67 of June 13, 1967, 10 ].0. COMM. EUR. 2269 (1967); Com-
mission Regulation (EEC) No. 473/67 of Aug. 21, 1967, 10 ].0. COMM. EUR. 16 (1967). See Solange I, 
supra note 2, at 272, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 545. 
12 The agency was the Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Cetreide und Futtermittel (Import and Supply Office 
for Cereals and Fodder), a federal office. Community regulations are administered through the 
administrative machinery of the member states. This fact often strikes Americans-who are accustomed 
to a more or less rigorous division of functions among the various levels of government-as a bit odd. 
Germans are more comfortable with such an arrangement. Compare, for instance, the long· standing 
practice of German cities which have traditionally discharged their autonomous powers (Selbstverwal-
tungsangelegenheiten) in tandem with duties imposed on them as agents of higher levels of government 
(Auftragsangelegenheiten). See the discussion in R. WELLS, GERMAN CITIES: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY 
MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 153-55 (1932). Similarly, Crundgesetz art. 83 (W. Ger.) 
provides that the Lander (states) of the Federal Republic are required to execute federal laws as 
"matters of their own concern [als eigene Angelegenheit]." 
I3 The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) is the court of original jurisdiction in the federal 
German judicial system having general competence over administrative matters, excluding tax and 
social insurance, which are handled by separate, specialized courts. The Administrative Courts, to-
gether with the Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht), are regarded as courts of the 
Lander; the administrative court structure is capped by the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesver-
waltungsgericht) in Berlin. See N. HORN, H. K()TZ & H. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: 
AN INTRODUCTION 33-34 (1982) [hereinafter N. HORN, H. K()TZ & H. LESER]. 
14 At issue was, in part, the principle of Verhiiltnismiissigkeit which, in its constitutional sense, is difficult 
to translate precisely. It addresses the necessity for proportionality and reasonableness in the acts 
performed by public authorities. The principle is grounded in the mandate of Crundgesetz art. 20 (W. 
Ger.) that "[l]egislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive [branch of govern-
ment] and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice." It is, therefore, a requirement for "non-
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The Frankfurt Administrative Court elected to refer the easelS to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice for a preliminary rulingl6 regarding the legality of the 
contested regulations. The Administrative Court left no doubt that, in its view, 
German courts should not enforce Community regulations that contravene 
fundamental rights arising from the German Constitution: despite its ratification 
of the EEC Treaty, the Federal Republic had impliedly reserved-in the absence 
of equivalent protections afforded by the Community-the right to protect 
fundamental liberties guaranteed in the Grundgesetz. 17 The Frankfurt Admin-
istrative Court concluded that since "less oppressive measures could be used to 
achieve the end of supervising the market,"18 the Community regulations should 
be declared invalid by the European Court. 
The European Court of Justice, in its subsequent preliminary ruling,19 took 
issue with the German Administrative Court's view concerning the application 
of the German Basic Law by Community organs: 
Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law to judge the 
validity of instruments promulgated by Community institutions 
would have the effect of harming the unity and efficacy of Com-
munity law. The validity of such instruments can only be judged in 
the light of Community law .... Therefore the validity of a Com-
munity instrument or its effect within a member-State cannot be 
affected by allegations that it strikes at either the fundamental rights 
arbitrariness" in public acts. The petitioner also asserted a violation of constitutional rights under 
Grundgesetz arts. 2 & 14 (W. Ger.); article 2 safeguards the free development of personality, while 
article 14 protects the right of property. 
15 Judgment of Mar. 18, 1970, 9 Common Mkt L.R. 294 (1970) (reference of case No. I1I2 E 2281 
69 [Internationale HandelsgesellschaJt], to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for prelim-
inary ruling under the EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177). 
16 Under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice of the European Communities had 
jurisdiction to provide "preliminary rulings" concerning validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions of the Community. In addition, that article provides that: 
Where any such question [of validity or interpretation] is raised before a court or tribunal of 
one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment depends 
on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
thereon. 
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177. 
17 Judgment of Mar. 18, 1970,9 Common Mkt. L.R. 294, 295 (1970). The Administrative Court 
went further and argued that the contested regulations were not only unenforceable, but a violation 
of the Treaty creating the European Economic Community: 
Failure to observe these structural principles of the German Constitution within the frame-
work of European Community law is technically a breach of the E.E.C. Treaty. It cannot have 
any validity within the sphere of national law .... [T]he E.E.C. institutions are obliged to 
recognise that [the petitioner'S asserted German constitutional right] is an essential part not 
only of the law of the Federal Republic but also of the Community. 
ld. at 295-96. 
IBId. at 302. 
,9 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futter-
mittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1125, II Common Mkt. L.R. 255 (1972). 
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as formulated in that State's constitution or the principles of a 
national constitutional structure.20 
The European Court made it clear, however, that the non application of specific 
German constitutional standards did not mean the absence of corresponding 
norms in Community law: 
An examination should however be made as to whether some anal-
ogous guarantee, inherent in Community law, has not been in-
fringed. For respect for fundamental rights has an integral part in 
the general principles of law of which the Court of Justice ensures 
respect. The protection of such rights, while inspired by the consti-
tutional principles common to the member-States, must be ensured 
within the framework of the Community's structure and objectives.21 
The European Court found that the bond forfeiture provision of the regu-
lations did not constitute an unreasonable burden on trade,22 and concluded 
that no fundamental right recognized in Community law had been violated. 
Upon remand of the case to the Administrative Court in Frankfurt, that court 
hotly contested the European Court's view of the relation between Community 
and national law: 
The question is certainly justified as to whether a certain decline in 
national institutions and constitutionality must be suffered as the 
price for the construction of a political union of Europe .... [1]f 
Community law ... is given precedence over any divergent consti-
tutional provisions, and this European legal system is exempt from 
the obligations contained in ... the [national] Constitution, it would 
lead to a constitutional and legal vacuum.23 
20/d. at 1135, II Common Mkt. L.R. at 283. 
21Id. The European Court has taken a recent opportunity to reaffirm its holding in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, both as to the autonomous character of Community law and the necessity to look 
to "the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures," in fashioning fundamental rights 
within the Community legal order. See Staatsanwalt Freiburg v. Keller. 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. _, 
48 Common Mkt. L.R. 875, 883-84 (1987). Ironically, this decision was reached on October 8, 1986, 
only two weeks prior to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in Solange II. 
22 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1138, II Common Mkt. L.R. at 285. 
23 Judgment of Nov. 24, 1971, II Common Mkt. L.R. 177, 184-85 (1972). The Administrative 
Court saw a threat to the democratic order of the German Federal Republic itself in the position taken 
by the European Court: 
For [if the position of the European Court were sustained] constitutional law would be 
eliminated as the highest national check on a European legislation that is becoming increas-
ingly more expansive without the institution of the equivalent legal safeguards. The democratic 
constitutional state guaranteed by the Constitution will itself only be able with difficulty to 
remain faithful to its basic decisions in constitutional law if as a result of particular advancing 
integration processes crucial spheres are withdrawn from its jurisdiction and, with the constant 
decline in the standing of the national legislature placed under a supranational, 'purely 
executive regime' which does not have to observe the fundamental principles laid down in 
... the Constitution in its measures. The supreme power contained in and bound by the 
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The Administrative Court, accordingly, initiated a review of these issues by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.24 
In its 1974 review of this issue, the Constitutional Court ruled that protection 
of German constitutional rights could not, under conditions then prevailing, be 
guaranteed by the European Court in its interpretation and application of 
Community secondary law: 
In this [connection], the present state of integration of the Com-
munity is of crucial importance. The Community still lacks a dem-
ocratically legitimated parliament directly elected by general suf-
frage which possesses legislative powers and to which the 
Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible on 
a political level; it still lacks in particular a codified catalogue of 
fundamental rights, the substance of which is reliably and unambig-
uously fixed for the future in the same way as the substance of the 
[national] Constitution and therefore allows a comparison and a 
decision as to whether, at the time in question, the Community law 
standard with regard to fundamental rights generally binding in the 
Community is adequate in the long term measured by the standard 
of the Constitution with regard to fundamental rights .... 25 
Constitution must not yield to a constitutional change effected from the outside by the 
Community, for which the democratic authorisation for the future has not been ensured. 
Id. at 185 (emphasis in the original). 
24 The Federal Constitutional Court has its 9rigin in Grundgesetz part IX and is statutorily governed 
in its operations by the Statute Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court. Gesttz aher das Bundes-
veifassungsgericht, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I] 2229-30, BGBl.III 1104-1 (W. Ger.). In general 
terms, this court has a monopoly of power to decide constitutional issues in the Federal Republic. 
Grundgesetz art. 93 (W. Ger.). No other court, confronting a question regarding the federal constitu-
tionality of a given law, may decide such issues. Under the provisions of Grundgesetz art. 100 (W. Ger.), 
another court must stay its own proceedings and obtain a ruling (Entscheidung) from the Federal 
Constitutional Court before considering the case further. This court-to-court submission (Vorlagever-
fahren) is regarded as a form of "concrete norm control" (Kronkrete Normenkontrolle). This procedure 
is to be contrasted with a constitutional complaint (Veifassungsbeschwerde) submitted under Grundgesetz 
art. 93(1)(4a) (W. Ger.), which may be initiated by any person claiming infringement by a public 
authority upon a right under the Grundgesetz. See generally the discussion of the Federal Constitutional 
Court and its functions appearing in N. HORN, H. KOTz Be H. LESER, supra note 13, at 20-26. In 1985, 
the Constitutional Court received 3,066 constitutional complaints; in the same year, only 37 submissions 
from other courts ("concrete norm control" cases) came before the court. See E. HOBER Be H. ROHLFS, 
JAHRBUCH DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: 1986/1987300 (1986). Solang. I was an example of a 
Vorlageveifahren; Solange II, discussed infra, came before the court on an individual constitutional 
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde). 
25 Solange I, supra note 2, at 280, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 550-51. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
of course, has such a "codified catalog of fundamental rights": 
The first chapter of the Basic Law is entitled "Basic Rights" ("Grundrechte"). These are in 
line "';'1) the general human and civil rights now recognized in all constitutional states in the 
West, and covered by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Here 
one finds the basic principles that everyone has the right to life, corporeal integrity, and the 
unhampered development of his personality (art. 2); that everyone is equal before the law 
(art. 3); that freedom of belief, conscience, religion, and ideology is inviolable (art. 4); and 
that everyone has the right to express himself freely in speech, writing, or pictures (art. 5). 
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The court reasoned that the intent of the German legislature in assenting to 
the EEC Treaty could not have been to transfer such powers to the Community 
so that the Community, by simple regulation, could enact measures that would 
infringe upon the constitutional order of the Federal Republic: 
Article 24 of the Constitution deals with the transfer of sovereign 
rights to inter-State institutions. This cannot be taken literally. Like 
every constitutional provision of a similar fundamental nature, Ar-
ticle 24 of the Constitution must be understood and construed in 
the overall context of the whole Constitution. That is, it does not 
open the way to amending the basic structure of the Constitution, 
which forms the basis of its identity, without a formal amendment 
to the Constitution; that is, it does not open any such way through 
the legislation of the inter-State institution.26 
The court therefore insisted on its continued exercise of the power to protect 
the integrity of fundamental rights in the German Basic Law, even against the 
European Court's interpretations of Community secondary law, "[als long as 
this legal certainty ... is not achieved in the course of the further integration 
of the Community .... "27 The question of whether the European Court was to 
be regarded as the "lawful adjudicator" of these matters in the sense of the 
Here, too, are the basic right of assembly (art. 8), the inviolability of the home (art. 13), and 
the right of petition (art. 17). In addition, all Germans are granted the right to form associ-
ations and societies, especially in the field of industrial relations (art. 9), to make a free choice 
of their career, place of work, and place of training (art. 12), and to refuse on grounds of 
conscience to serve in the armed forces (art. 4). The state affords special protection to marriage 
and the family (art. 6), and it guarantees the right of property and inheritance by providing 
that there shall be no expropriation except for the common good and against fair compen-
sation (art. 14). Some other basic rights are conferred elsewhere in the Basic Law, such as the 
right to a hearing in the courts, the freedom from punishment under retroactive laws, and 
the freedom from double punishment for a single act (art. 103). There are also provisions 
on the citizen's rights in relation to arrest and detention (art. 104). 
N. HORN, H. KaTZ, & H. LESER, supra note 13, at 21-22. 
26 Solange I, supra note 2, at 279, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 550. This implied reservation under 
Grundgesetz art. 24 (W. Ger.) was strict in requiring a virtual equivalency in fundamental rights 
protection by the transferee organization as a condition of the Constitutional Court's recognition of 
its competency to adjudicate fundamental rights under the Grundgesetz. Decisions from the court-
after Solange I, but before Solange II-relaxed this standard somewhat. In Eurocontrol I (Judgment of 
June 23, 1981, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 58 BVerfGE I), the court reasoned that article 24 
contemplates Germany's participation in international organizations; hence, the standard of funda-
mental rights equivalency cannot be placed so high as to preclude effectively such participation. In 
Eurocontrol II (Judgment of Nov. 10, 1981, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 59 BVerfGE 63), the 
court found no infringement of the basic right to judicial review where the Administrative Court of 
the International Labor Organization was granted jurisdiction over labor disputes arising from the 
operation of the Eurocontrol organization. Neither of these decisions concerned the European Com-
munity; they have some bearing, however, on the court's growing acceptance of Federal German 
participation in international organizations and the practical implications of the participation. See 
generally A. Greifeld, Requirements of the German Constitution for the Installation of Supranational Authority, 
20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 87 (1983). 
27 Sotange I, supra note 2, at 280, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 551. 
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Basic Law was left open.28 The court struck a brighter note by conceding that 
"[w]hat is involved is ... a legal difficulty arising exclusively from the Com-
munity's continuing integration process, which is still in flux and which will end 
with the present transitional phase."29 
A vigorous dissent by three of the eight judges of the Constitutional Court 
challenged the majority view regarding the limited transfer of power to the 
Community through the Treaty of Rome. In their view, this transfer vested 
"sovereign rights"30 in the Community whose exercise was not to be limited by 
subsequent national review: 
The sovereign acts which are to be recognized and which are not 
subject to any national review include the law-making of the Euro-
pean Community organs. The rules of law issued by them cannot 
therefore be dependent in their validity and applicability on whether 
they match the criteria of national law. In content, Community law 
takes precedence over divergent provisions of national law. This 
applies not only in relation to norms of simple national law, but also 
vis-a-vis norms of the national Constitution dealing with fundamen-
tal rights. 31 
Moreover, from the dissent's perspective, the majority'S anxiety over basic rights 
was misplaced, since "[t]he protection of fundamental rights guaranteed inside 
the Community does not differ in essence and structure from the fundamental 
rights system of the [German] national Constitution"32 and, in any event, the 
Community should not be under a requirement to protect basic rights "in 
precisely the same form"33 in which the constitutions of member states protect 
them. 
28 Grundgesetz art. 101(1) (W. Ger.) guarantees that "[n]o one may be removed from the jurisdiction 
of his lawful judge (Niemand dar! seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden)." Since the Constitutional 
Court had implied a continuing reservation in favor of national protection of basic rights in the 
accession of the Federal Republic to the EEC Treaty, it follows that the European Court might not be 
considered a "lawful judge" with respect to a final adjudication of this category of rights. The court 
refrained, however, from making an explicit declaration to this effect. 
29 Solange I, supra note 2, at 280-81, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 551. 
30Id. at 291, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 559. 
31 !d. at 295-96, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 562. The dissent's use of the wording "Community law 
take precedence over divergent provisions of national law [Gemeinschaftsrecht geht inhaltlich abweichenden 
Bestimmungen des nationalen Rechts vor]" was purposeful; it evokes ancient principles of the German 
constitutional order ("The law of the Empire takes precedence over state law [Reichsrecht bricht Lan-
desrecht],,) and fundamental provisions of the modern Grundgesetz art. 31 (W. Ger.) ("Federal law shall 
override Land law [Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht],,). The dissenting judges are positing a vertical 
integration of Community and German law, in opposition to the coordination of autonomous systems 
championed by the majority opinion. 
32 Solange I, supra note 2, at 296-97, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 563. 
33 !d. at 297, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 563. This phrase is somewhat hyperbolic; the majority judges 
nowhere required Community law to protect fundamental rights in exactly the same fashion as does 
national law. 
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The majority opinion in Solange I voiced strong views regarding the integrity 
of fundamental rights under the German Basic Law. The minority judges, in 
turn, expressed their concerns with respect to the integrity of Community 
legislation and the goal of a united Europe: 
If the applicability of secondary Community law were dependent 
on its satisfying the fundamental rights norms of a national Consti-
tution, then-since the member-States guarantee fundamental 
rights to differing extents-the situation could arise where legal 
rules of the Communities are applicable in some member-States, 
but not in others. This would result, precisely on the field of Com-
munity law, in a fragmentation of law. To open up this possibility 
means exposing a part of European legal unity, endangering the 
existence of the Community, and negating the basic idea of Euro-
pean unification.34 
Although the decision reached by the Federal Constitutional Court in Solange 
I provoked a storm of criticism,35 the ruling remained in force for a dozen 
years. An uneasy peace settled over Europe in those quarters concerned with 
the unity of the European Community system and the integration of the eco-
34 Id. at 298, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 564. 
35 The Commission reported that it had informed the Federal German government of its "grave 
concern" regarding the decision, asserting that: 
This ruling is contrary to Community law-and in particular to the principle of its autonomy 
and of its primacy over national law, including constitutional law-and to all the relevant case 
law of the European Court. Accordingly it is a dangerous threat to the unity of Community 
law and creates uncertainty as to the latter's uniform application. 
By claiming the power to verify the compatibility of Community secondary legislation with 
the fundamental rights in the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court is impugning the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
treaties the law is observed .... 
Commission of the European Communities, Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 
270 (1974). Edeson and Wooldridge, moreover, questioned whether the decision was a violation by 
Germany of the EEC Treaty. W. Edeson & F. Wooldridge, European Community Law and Fundamental 
Human Rights: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court and National Courts, 1976/1 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. 
INTEGRATION I, 44-45. 
Christoph Vedder has observed that "[t]he first Solange decision was flat out damned for legal 
reasons and on grounds of [European] integration politics." Vedder, Ein neuer gesetzlicher Richter?, 10 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT 526, 527 (1987) (translated by the author). None of this could have 
escaped the notice of the Constitutional Court, which must have been uncomfortable with the strident 
response to its ruling in Solange I. A portent of things to come appeared in its "Vielleicht [Perhaps ... 
]" Judgment of July 25, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 52 BVerfGE 187. The question 
before the Constitutional Court in that case was one of potential conflict between primary Community 
law-the EEC Treaty-and the Grundgesetz. Predictably, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Eu-
ropean Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty and that its interpretation was binding 
on the German courts. It went further and, in pure obiter dicta, expressed doubts about the continuing 
validity of its rule in Solange l, questioning "whether and, if applicable, to what extent, the principles 
[of Solange I] can, in view of the political or legal developments occurring in the intervening time in 
Europe, claim unlimited application in future matters concerning norms of derivative Community 
law." ld. at 202-03. 
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nomic, social, and political orders on the continent. This impasse86 was not to 
be broken until the Constitutional Court took up the issue once again in Solange 
II87 in late 1986. 
III. SOLANGE II 
When an opportunity arose twelve years later for the Federal Constitutional 
Court to reconsider the position taken in Solange I, the question presented itself 
to the court, appropriately enough, in a context similar to the circumstances 
56 The deadlock remained largely theoretical as a result of mutual judicial restraint and a desire in 
both courts to avoid a doctrinal clash with dire consequences for the survival of the Communities. 
So/ange I is representative of this phenomenon; having decided that fundamental rights under the 
Grundgesetz would prevail over contrary Community secondary law, the court found that the regulations 
there in issue, as interpreted by the European Court, did not in fact violate any basic rights guarantees 
of the Grundgesetz. So/ange I, supra note 2, at 288, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 556. 
37 So/ange II, supra note 1. The Federal Republic of Germany was not, of course, the only member 
state of the Communities to experience difficulties in the integration of Community and national law. 
Of special interest in this connection is the similar evolution in the constitutional law of the Republic 
of Italy. The Italian decision of Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL) (Judgment of Mar. 
7, 1964, Corte Costituzionale, Italy, 87 Foro Italiano I [Foro It. I] 465, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425 
(1964» had placed Community secondary law on a constitutional par with national legislation. The 
Corte Costituzionale reasoned that measures enacted by the Community through authority delegated by 
the EEC Treaty had "no greater legal effect than that which inheres in its legal source," or in this 
instance, a "permissive norm" under the Costituzione art. 11. One implication of this holding was that 
Community secondary law could be amended by subsequent national legislation. See Costa v. ENEL, 
Judgment of Mar. 7, 1964,87 Foro It. 1465,3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425 (1964). The corle moved away 
from this position somewhat in Societa Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Judgment of Dec. 16, 1965, reprinted in 6 Common Mkt. L.R. 160 (1967» 
where it emphasized the autonomous character of Community law and conceded that, at least in some 
respects, it need not conform with Italian constitutional requirements. A further shift from the ENEL 
attitude regarding Community law occurred with the corte's ruling in Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze 
(Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973,94 Foro It: I 314, reprinted in 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 372 (1974» where 
it confirmed the constitutionality of the Italian ratification of the EEC Treaty and affirmed the transfer 
to the Community of partial legislative power, the exercise of which was not subject to later national 
amendment. The corte reserved to itself, however, the continuing right to pass on the compatibility of 
Community legislation with fundamental rights under the Costituzione. In ICIC v. Ministero del Com-
mericio con l'Estero (Judgment of Oct. 30, 1975,98 Foro It. I 2661, referenced in 13 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 524, 525-26 (1976) the corte drew the logical conclusion from the reservation expressed in 
Frontin; and ruled that lower Italian national courts were not competent to decide constitutional 
conflicts with Community law and that these should be referred to the corte for resolution. The 
European Court took issue with this requirement in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 479 (1978), and ruled 
that, under EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 177, the lower national courts had the right to submit such 
questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling. The corte, in its decision in S.p.A. Comavicola 
v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Judgment of Oct. 26, 1981, reprinted in 19 CoMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 455 (1982) confirmed its role as the sole arbiter of the Italian Costituzione. It abandoned 
this position, however, with its 1984 opinion in S.p.A. Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato (Judgment of June 8, 1984, reprinted in 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 756 (1984); as one observer 
notes-almost with a touch of sadness-the corle's ruling in Granital was prompted by its "wish to put 
an end to the twenty-year conflict with the [European] Court of Justice, by substantially accepting the 
latter Court's ruling in Simmenthal." Annotation, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 764, 766 (1984). 
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giving rise to its original opinion. International trade regulations of the EEC 
Council and Commission were once again to provide the legal background of 
a dispute striking at the heart of the continuing disagreement respecting the 
coordination of Community and national law. 
A. The EEC Regulatory Framework of Solange II 
Some of the most important provisions of the Treaty of Rome are those that 
address the foundation of a common market for agricultural products within 
the Community. Title II of the Treaty-encompassing Articles 38 through 47, 
inclusive-erects the general framework of a Community "common agricultural 
policy" which is designed to achieve the objectives delineated in Article 39. 
These include, inter alia, increased agricultural productivity, a fair standard of 
living in the agricultural sector of the Community, market stabilization, the 
assurance of supply availability, and reasonable prices to consumers of Com-
munity agricultural products. 
The Treaty terms envision an arsenal of devices to be employed in the pursuit 
of this common agricultural policy. Common competition rules, coordinated 
national market organizations, and the implementation of a Community-wide 
market organization are specifically contempiated,S8 together with "all [other] 
measures necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 39, in particular 
price controls ... and [a] common machinery for stabilising importation or 
exportation."s9 
The Community first applied this broad authority under the Treaty in 1967 
to the intra-Community market encompassing processed fruits and vegetables. 
In that year, the Council promulgated regulatory controls40 for processed fruits 
and vegetables containing sugar and glucose, based upon the guidelines pro-
vided by an earlier regulation addressed to an interim sugar market organization 
in the Community,4l A year later, this regulation was itself replaced by a far-
ranging regulatory scheme for processed fruit and vegetable products.42 
.8 EEC Treaty. supra note 3. at art. 40(2)(a)-(c) . 
• 9 [d. at art. 40(3). 
40 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 789/67 of Oct. 31. 1967. 10 ].0. COMM. EUR. 1 (1967). 
4' Council Regulation (EEC) No. 44/67 of Feb. 21, 1967, 10 ].0. COMM. EUR. 597 (1967). 
42 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 865/68 of June 28, 1968. 11 ].0. COMM. EUR. (No. Ll53) 8 (1968), 
1968 Special Eng. Ed. 225 (1972). Although article 7 of this Regulation enabled the Council to adopt 
"necessary provisions to co-ordinate and standardise the treatment accorded by each Member State to 
imports from third countries," it was to do so on a proposal from the Commission. Article 14 of the 
Regulation provided. however. for the creation of a Management Committee for Products Processed 
from Fruit and Vegetables. consisting of national representatives and presided over by a representative 
of the Commission. This Committee. under the provisions of article 15, was to formulate necessary 
regulatory controls for consideration by the Commission. Regulations so adopted were to have im-
mediate effect although the Council could override the Commission decision within one month of the 
Commission action. The use of the. Management Committee system was contested, but approved. in 
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Under Article 7 of this comprehensive regulation, the power to adopt rules 
governing the system of trade in processed fruits and vegetables with non-EEC 
nations was vested in the Council. Subsequently, in 1971, the Council set forth 
a series of basic guidelines for the adoption of protective measures with respect 
to the importation of processed foods into the Community.43 
This regulation was displaced in 1975 by a Council Regulation44 which pre-
served, verbatim, in Article 7(1), important limiting language of its predecessor 
making clear the stop-gap character of this regulatory authority: 
If, by reason of imports or exports, the Community market in one 
or more of the products specified in Article 1(1) [of this Regulation] 
is or is likely to be exposed to serious disturbances which might 
endanger the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty, appro-
priate measures may be applied in trade with third countries until 
such disturbances or the threat thereof has ceased.45 
Moreover, this amended Council Regulation was supplemented by a later 
provision which enumerated, in its Article 1, the elements of a "serious market 
disturbance" such as would trigger the mechanism for the imposition by the 
Commission of import restrictions. These elements included 
a) the volume of imports or exports affected or foreseen; 
b) the quantities of products available on the Community market; 
c) the prices for Community products on the Community market 
or the foreseeable trend of these prices and in particular any ex-
cessive upward or downward trend thereof in relation to prices in 
the years immediately preceding; 
d) where the mentioned above situation arises as a result of im-
ports, the prices obtaining on the Community market, at a compa-
rable stage, for products from third countries, and in particular any 
excessive downward trend in these prices.46 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fUr Getreide und Futtermittel v. Koster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E. Comm. Ct. 
]. Rep. II61, II Common Mkt. L.R. 288 (1972). 
43 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1427171 of July 2,1971,14 ].0. COMM. EUR. (No. LI51) 5 (1971), 
1971 Special Eng. Ed. 468 (1972). 
44 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1927175 of July 22, 1975, 180.]. EUR. COMM. (No. LI98) 7 (1975). 
In the event of a serious market disturbance, the Commission had the power to adopt necessary 
measures with immediate effect throughout the Community (art. 7(2»; the Council, however, could 
later amend or annul the Commission's action at the request of a member state (art. 7(3». This Council 
veto procedure was also approved by the European Court in Koster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E. Comm. Ct. 
]. Rep. II6l, II Common Mkt. L.R. 288 (1972). 
45 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1927175 of July 22, 1975, 18 OJ. COMM. EUR. (No. LI98) art. 7(1), 
at 9 (1975). 
46 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1928175 of July 22, 1975, 18 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. LI98) art. I, 
at 12 (1975). 
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When a consideration of these factors indicated the presence of a market 
disturbance, an import license could be denied in toto to an applicant,47 subject 
to the limitation that such measures should be employed "only to such extent 
and for such length of time as is strictly necessary."48 
Confronted with chaotic conditions in the canned mushroom market within 
the Community during the first two quarters of 1974, the EEC Commission 
moved to adopt emergency provisions49 restricting the importation of canned 
mushrooms and subjecting such imports to special licensing procedures under 
the authority of Council Regulation No. 1427171. 
The 1974 Commission Regulation in Article 1 (1) initiated a general require-
ment within the Community for special import licenses regarding preserved 
mushrooms from nonmember countries, effective August 26, 1974.50 Pursuant 
to Article 2(2) of that regulation, the Commission was given the authority to 
determine the quantities of goods for which import licenses were to be issued 
to individual importers, with these quantities to be fixed in accordance with the 
standards set forth in Article 3. Article 3 (as amended in 1975 by Commission 
Regulation 1869175) fixed the importable quantities at a percentage, to be 
determined by the Commission from time to time on the basis of prevailing 
market conditions within the Community, of the amounts introduced into the 
Community by the importer during the corresponding period of 1973. More-
over, Article 1(2) of the regulation (as amended by Regulation 1869175) required 
that licenses be obtained in advance and on a quarterly basis. In addition to the 
draconian measures set forth in the Council's Regulation allowing the wholesale 
denial of any import license altogether, this reservation proved successful in 
providing a tool for the flexible reduction of such imports. For the third quarter 
of 1976, the Commission fixed imports at a ceiling of 70 percent of the appli-
cable reference amount determined by Article 3 of Regulation 1869175;51 by 
471d. at art. 2(1). This provision permitted the "total or partial discontinuation of the issue of 
[import] certificates" as to products falling within the import certificate system; the same provision 
also allowed total and partial suspension of imports of products not within the import certificate 
system. 
481d. at art. 2(2). 
49 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2107174 of Aug. S, 1974, 17 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L2IS) 54 
(1974). The preamble to the Regulation noted that "imports into the Community of preserved mush-
rooms during the 1973 marketing year amounted to some 40,000 metric tons," a figure "considerably 
higher" than in previous years; that imports in the first half of 1974 ran 50% higher than the same 
period in 1973; and that "offer prices from third countries are 20 to 30% less than the cost price 
within the Community .... " Id. 
sO/d. This Regulation was later amended by the adoption of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 
IS69175 of July 22,1975, IS OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. Ll90) 23 (1975). 
51 This percentage represented an increase over the 55 percent ceiling fixed by Commission Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 661176 of Mar. 25, 1976, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. LSO) 15 (1976), which governed 
preserved mushroom imports for the second quarter of 1976. The Commission attributed the market 
improvements to "the application of the protective measures" contained in its earlier regulations; 
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the final half of 1976, market conditions had improved to such an extent that 
the Commission adjusted this ceiling upward to 100 percent of the applicable 
reference quantity.52 
At the end of 1976, the Commission repealed its regulatory restrictions in 
their entirety since, in its judgment, protective measures were no longer justi-
fied, given the improved market circumstances in the Community. 53 Their 
enforcement in Germany prior to revocation, however, was to set in motion the 
elements of a constitutional confrontation which would ultimately resolve the 
lingering doubts created by the first Solange decision and, in the process, alter 
the legal landscape of Europe. 
B. Solange II before the German Courts 
On July 9, 1976, a German processed-foods importer, Wunsche Handelsgesells-
chaft, filed an application for a license to import one thousand tons of Taiwanese 
canned mushrooms into the Federal Republic of Germany. Directed to the 
Federal Office of Food and Forestry (Bundesamt fur Erniihrung und Forstwirt-
schaft), the import license application was, after internal review, denied by the 
agency on July 15, 1976, on the basis of the EEC Community Regulations then 
in effect. 54 
In its subsequent complaint before the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsger-
icht) in Frankfurt am Main, the importer attacked this agency decision on the 
grounds that the EEC regulations in issue were invalid since they were premised 
on poor market conditions which no longer existed at the time of the license 
application.55 The petitioner argued that, as temporary protective measures, 
the regulations had lost their basis in fact and, therefore, in law. Cessante ratione 
these. it asserted, had led "to a certain recovery in the prices of Community and third country products 
and to a marked decrease [in prices] within the Community." Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1412/ 
76 of June 18, 1976, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. LJ58) 37 (1976). It remained cautious, however: "the 
percentage applicable to the reference quantity for imports of preserved cultivated mushrooms from 
third countries should be increased," but only incrementally, in order to ensure "that the Community 
market does not undergo serious disturbances due to these imports." Id. 
5. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2284176 of Sept. 21, 1976, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L258) 5 
(1976) . 
.. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3096/76 of Dec. 17, 1976, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L348) 26 
(1976). The Commission specifically noted its finding that "the situation which gave rise to these 
[earlier] protective measures i[s] coming to an end" and that "the ... Regulation should therefore be 
repealed." Id. 
54 The facts underlying the case appear in English in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Federal 
Republic of Germany. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1480-87, (1981-1983 Transfer Binder) 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8830 . 
.. The position of the petitioner before the lower German courts is reported in detail in the 
subsequent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. See generally the discussion in Sotang. II, supra 
note I, at 344-53. 
16 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XI, No. I 
legis, cessat et ipsa lex: the regulations should have been repealed by the Com-
mission as soon as the market crisis in processed mushrooms had passed.56 
The evidentiary record before the Administrative Court was replete with 
indications that the emergency existing in the European market for canned 
mushrooms which sparked the initial Commission Regulations of 1974 had 
abated by the time petitioner had applied for an import license. 57 The German 
Federal Office of Food and Forestry had sought modification of the Commis-
sion's regulations so as to allow increased imports from without the Community, 
but to no avail. 58 
The Administrative Court, in dismissing the complaint, ruled that the con-
tested regulations were consistent with the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty 
of Rome. On the record before the court, it found no manifest abuse of 
discretion by the Commission in maintaining import restrictions after the first 
two quarters of 1976. Moreover, the court rebuffed the petitioner'S effort to 
seek a preliminary ruling on its objections to the regulations by the European 
Court of Justice.59 
On an immediate review60 of this decision, the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) in Berlin agreed that the central issue in the case was 
the continuing validity after June 1976 of the Community'S regulations. In the 
court's view, the denial could have been premised only on Commission Regu-
lation No. 2107174 which, in turn, looked for an authoritative base in Council 
Regulations Nos. 1927175 and 1928175.61 The court observed that the Commis-
sion's regulatory authority in this regard had been restricted by the Council to 
the enactment of provisions "only to the extent and for the period of time 
absolutely necessary" and that the regulations "would therefore have to be 
repealed as soon as the disturbances against which it was designed to protect 
have been eliminated or no longer threaten to OCCUr."62 For the Federal Ad-
56 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2107174 of Aug. 8, 1974, 17 OJ. EVR. COMM. (No. L218) 54 
(1974) was repealed by Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3096176 of Dec. 17, 1976, 19 OJ. EVR. 
COMM. (No. L348) 26 (1976). See supra notes 49 and 53. In light of this development, the German 
Office of Food and Forestry had issued the petitioner's import license during the course of the litigation 
before the Frankfurt Administrative Court. Petitioner was insistent, however, that the license be issued 
on the basis of its application of July 9, 1976, because of "the danger of repetition [of the import 
restrictions] through renewed, improper utilization of protective measures." Solange II, supra note I, 
at 344. See also Wunsche, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1480-81, (1981-1983 Transfer Binder) 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) If 8830. 
57 Solange II, supra note I, at 346. 
58Id. 
59 /d., at 344-45. 
60 sprungrevision permits the petitioner to by-pass the Higher Administrative Court, the normal 
appellate tribunal reviewing cases arising in an Administrative Court. 
61 Solange II, supra note I, at 345. 
62 See id. at 345-46, where the Federal Constitutional Court reviews the reasoning (Begrllndung) of 
the Federal Administrative Court in the latter court's Judgment of Mar. 21, 1981. 
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mmlstrative Court, then, the observance by the Commission of the Council's 
regulatory limitation was the paramount issue, a question it regarded as sin-
gularly appropriate to the European Court of Justice. Accordingly, the Federal 
Administrative Court sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court as 
to the validity of the Commission's Regulation.63 
C. The European Court of Justice 
In the proceedings before the European Court resulting in its preliminary 
ruling of May 6, 1982, the petitioner repeated its contentions regarding the 
invalidity of the contested Commission Regulations beyond the end of June 
1976.64 
The Commission, for its part, insisted that its regulations should be tested 
for their validity as of the time of their adoption65 and not-as petitioner 
apparently had done-in light of post facto market developments. Measured by 
this standard, the Commission argued, its regulations were neither factually 
erroneous nor were they an abuse of its discretion. The Commission introduced 
statistical evidence from the German Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches Bun-
desamt)66 and the French National Federal Association for Products Processed 
from Fruits and Vegetables (Association Nationale Interprofessionelle des Fruits et 
Legumes Transformes)67 indicating that, although an intermittent rise in canned 
mushroom prices had taken place in the Community market since the drastic 
drop of 1972-1974, the pre-1972 price level had not again been achieved until 
the last months of 1976.68 From the Commission's perspective, the information 
available to it in mid-1976 did not warrant a repeal of protective measures 
regarding the canned mushroom market but, at most, allowed incremental 
opening of the Community's borders to third countries as provided in Regu-
63 See supm note 16, concerning the authority of the European Court of Justice to issue preliminary 
rulings on application by national courts of the member states. The issue posed here by the Federal 
Administrative Court to the European Court, as reported in Wunsche, was a model of comprehensive-
ness: 
Did Regulation (EEC) No 2107174 of the Commission of8 August 1974 laying down protective 
measures applicable to imports of preserved mushrooms ... infringe the combined provisions 
of Article 7(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1927175 of the Council of 22 July 1975 concerning 
the system of trade with third countries in the market in products processed from fruit and 
vegetables ... and Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEe) No 1928175 of the Council of 22 July 
1975 laying down detailed rules for applying measures in the market in products processed 
from fruit and vegetables ... in so far as it was retained in force after 30 June 1976? 
Wunsche. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1482-83 (quoting reference to the Court of Justice from 
the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin). 
64 [d. at 1483-85. 
65 [d. at 1485, citing Firma A. Dilrbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen, 1981 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095, 1114,35 Common Mkt. L.R. 314, 338 (1982). 
66 Wunsche, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1485-86. 
67 [d. at 1486. 
68 [d. at 1486-87. 
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lations 1412176 and 2284176.69 Conceding that these measures were of a tem-
porary character and intended to persist only as long as absolutely necessary, 
the Commission nevertheless insisted, with respect to the "assessment of eco-
nomic events," on "wide discretion" to consider factors beyond those enumer-
ated in Article 1 of Regulation 1928175.70 The European Court concurred and 
ruled that the regulations were valid.7J 
D. On Return to the Federal Administrative Court 
In the renewed proceedings before the Federal Administrative Court,72 the 
disappointed importer assailed the adequacy of the procedure before the Eu-
ropean Court, insisting that its decision had ignored the factual record, partic-
ularly the evidence indicating a rise in market prices for canned mushrooms in 
the last two quarters of 1976.73 The court had, in addition, relied on nonveri-
liable data and on statistics devoid of evidentiary competence.74 These apparent 
abuses assumed constitutional proportions in petitioner's view. The European 
Court had usurped, the petitioner claimed, the function of the national court 
in making factual determinations, denying it the constitutional guarantee of 
adjudication of these issues by a lawful judge.75 Further, the petitioner insisted 
that it had been deprived of its constitutional privilege freely to practice its 
trade76 and that its constitutional right to a hearing had been violated substan-
69 [d. at 1487. 
70 The Commission asserted that 
lilt [the Commission) enjoys a wide discretion with regard to the assessment of economic 
events. It remains free to take into account factors other than those listed in Article I of 
Regulation No 1928175. It must give special consideration to those factors, but may also adopt 
measures where just one of the indicators discloses the existence of a serious threat. It must 
in addition limit or abolish the effect of the measures adopted once they are no longer 
absolutely necessary. 
[d. at 1485. 
7I "In [the factual) circumstances [shown to the court), it cannot be denied that the Commission kept 
within the limits of its discretion in considering, when it adopted the contested regulations, that the 
situation on the market did not yet permit the abolition of the protective measures introduced in 
1974." [d. at 1492. 
72 These proceedings are summarized in Solange II, supra note I, at 349-51. 
" [d. at 350. 
74 [d. (nicht uberprufbare Zahlen and statistiken mit fehlender Aussagekraft). 
75 K.P.E. Lasok has observed that the Community Court is "competent only to rule on the question 
of Community law referred to it" for a preliminary ruling pursuant to the EEC Treaty. See EEC 
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177. "[T)he national court remains competent to decide the dispute 
between the parties and any other issue of fact or law." K. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 46 (1984) [hereinafter LASOK). To the extent that the European Court had 
determined factual issues, it acted without proper jurisdiction, depriving petitioner of a lawful judge 
within the meaning of Grundgesetz art. !OI(I) (W. Ger.). Solnnge II, supra note I, at 351. 
76 Solnnge II, supra note I, at 351. Petitioner's argument was grounded in Grundgesetz art. 12(1) (W. 
Ger.), governing the practice of trades, occupations and professions. 
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tially by the European Court's consideration of improper evidence.77 To secure 
a review of these contentions, the petitioner sought to have the court present 
the case to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. In the alternative, it 
sought leave to appeal anew to the European Court.78 
The Federal Administrative Court rejected each of these maneuvers, holding 
that, while petitioner had the right to an appeal to the European Court under 
the Treaty, this right had been satisfied by that court's earlier consideration of 
the evidence before it. 79 Further, no direct review of the constitutional law 
implications of the European Court decision was available in the Constitutional 
Court. While that court had asserted in Solange I the right to evaluate secondary 
Community law against the standard of German constitutional rights, it claimed 
no authority directly to review the decisions of the European Court as such.80 
77 Salange II, supra note 1, at 350. Grundgesetz art. 103(1) (W. Ger.) guarantees that "[i]n the courts 
everyone shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law." Since the petitioner felt that the 
European Court had not given proper attention to a major part of its argument, it argued before the 
Federal Constitutional Court that the European Court had violated this constitutional right to be 
heard. 
78 Salange II, supra note I, at 349-50. 
79 In a prior decision, the Federal Constitutional Court had taken the position that a German court 
could request a second ruling from the European Court where a preliminary ruling obtained under 
the EEC Treaty was incorrect or unclear. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177. See alsa Judgment 
of July 25, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 52 BVerfGE 187, 201; Milch, Fette- und Eier Kontor 
G.m.b.H. v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 165, 180, where the court held 
that "[a]n interpretation given by the Court of Justice binds the national court in question but it is for 
the latter to decide whether it is sufficiently enlightened by the preliminary ruling given or whether 
it is necessary to make a further reference to the [European] Court." As noted by the Constitutional 
Court, the Federal Administrative Court "rejected a renewed appeal to the European Court pursuant 
to Article 177, paragraph 3, of the EEC Treaty on the basis that the appropriate presentation of the 
appeal referred solely to the [European] Court's consideration of evidence; this however did not 
constitute a reason to question the propriety or clarity of the judgment." Salange II, supra note I, at 
351. 
80 Salange II, supra note I, at 351. In Salange I, the Constitutional Court had disclaimed the power 
to pass directly on the validity of Community secondary law as implemented or enforced by a Com-
munity organ (including the European Court): 
An initial barrier to the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht emerges from the fact 
that it can only make the subject of its review acts of German State power, that is, decisions 
of the courts, administrative acts of the authorities and measures of the constitutional organs 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. For this reason, the Bundesverfassungsgericht regards 
as inadmissible a constitutional action (Verfassungsbeschwerde) by a citizen of the Federal 
Republic of Germany directly against a Community regulation. 
Salange I, supra note 2, at 283, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 553; see alsa Judgment of Oct. 18, 1967,22 
BVerGE 293, 297, summarized in 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 483 (1968). As a result 
[t]he Bundesverfassungsgericht never rules on the validity or invalidity of a rule of Com-
munity law. At most, it can come to the conclusion that such a rule cannot be applied by the 
authorities or courts of the Federal Republic of Germany in so far as it conflicts with a rule 
of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights. 
Salange I, supra note 2, at 281-82, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 552. Petitioner's demand, then, that the 
decision of the European Court be transferred directly to the Federal Constitutional Court for con-
stitutional review was dismissed. This result would not, of course, preclude a de nava constitutional 
complaint against a German court which approved an "unconstitutional" result in the European Court. 
See supra note 24. Petitioner subsequently took advantage of this procedure. 
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The Federal Administrative Court observed that petitioner had made no ar-
gument before the European Court regarding any infringement of constitu-
tional rights.81 Moreover, the court noted, petitioner'S basic thrust centered on 
the invalidity of the protective measures adopted by the Commission when 
examined in light of the controlling Council Regulations: the dispute was, at 
base, a question dealing with the coordination and interpretation of higher and 
lower orders of secondary Community law, a process over which the European 
Court has proper jurisdiction.82 For the Berlin Court, then, a direct review by 
the German Constitutional Court or a renewed appeal to the European Court 
both were foreclosed to the petitioner. 
E. Before the Federal Constitutional Court 
Frustrated in its efforts to secure a direct judicial review, the petitioner filed 
a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, naming 
the Federal Administrative Court as respondent. This complaint alleged a basket 
of constitutional violations, addressing the propriety of the Berlin Court's de-
cision not to submit the matter to the European Court or to the Federal Con-
stitutional Court for further direct review and contending that the Community 
Regulations were, in operation, violations of fundamental rights under the 
German Basic Law. 83 
81 The petitioner had asserted primarily the lack of a factual basis for the extension of the contested 
regulations beyond June 30,1976. See Wi/ruche, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1479, (1981-1983 Transfer 
Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8830. Its constitutional arguments were not pressed with vigor 
until the return of the case to the Federal Administrative Court after the preliminary ruling by the 
Court of Justice. The bulk of the petitioner'S dissatisfaction at that point centered on the purported 
"mishandling" of the case by the latter court. 
82 The Federal Constitutional Court considered that 
by asserting that the [Commission] Regulations (EEC) No. 1412176 and No. 2284/76 are not 
covered by the authorization of [Council] Regulation (EEC) No. 1927175 Article 7 § I, [the 
petitioner] was measuring secondary Community law. Even if one should use as a basis the 
legal theory espoused in the Federal Constitutional Court's decision [in Solange I], the Federal 
Constitutional Court was not authorized to conduct such a review, since it concerns interpre-
tation of Community law exclusively ... for which the European Court alone has jurisdiction. 
Solange II, supra note I, at 352. 
8' The Constitutional Court observed that, "[ w lith its constitutional complaint, the petitioner alleges 
that the judgment of the Federal Administrative Court encroaches upon its procedural and substantive 
fundamental rights [verletze sie in prozessualen und materiellen Grundrechtenl." ld. at 353. The petitioner 
argued that by holding enforceable Commission Regulations (EEC) No. 1412176, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No. LJ58) 37 (1976) and No. 2284176, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L258) 5 (1976), the Federal Admin-
istrative Court had sanctioned violations by the EEC Commission of the constitutional guarantees of 
proportionality and legal certainty rooted in Grundgesetz arts. 2(1), 12(1) & 20(3) (W. Ger.). See generally 
Solange II, supra note I, at 359-62. While the enabling legislation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1927175, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. LJ98) 7 (1975) effectively incorporated these constitutional protec-
tions by narrowly restricting the range, both as to substance and time, of permissible regulatory a!=tion 
which could be taken by the Commission, the petitioner maintained that the latter body had ignored 
these limitations, thereby violating not only the conditions imposed by the Council but important 
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In petitioner's view, the Federal Administrative Court had done nothing more 
than rubber-stamp the erroneous decision of the European Court; to the extent 
that the European Court had. violated petitioner's constitutional rights, these 
violations tainted the decision of the Federal Administrative Court as weH.84 
F. The Decision in Solange II 
A central point in the Constitutional Court's 1974 holding in Solange I had 
been that the Community institutions that could, with elaboration, serve as 
protective bulwarks against the intrusion by Community agencies upon basic 
and fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Basic Law were not yet fuHy 
developed. Its review of these institutions in Solange II persuaded the court in 
1986 that circumstances in the Community had changed to such an extent that 
the earlier reservations regarding Community institutions could be abandoned. 
A unanimous Constitutional Court ruled that the European Court is now to be 
regarded as the lawful adjudicator where Community secondary law is aHeged 
to be in conflict with fundamental rights under the German Constitution.85 
principles of German constitutional law as well. Solange II, supra note I, at 360. Moreover, according 
to the petitioner, the arbitrary manner in which the Commission adopted its regulations, seemingly 
without relation to actual market conditions prevailing in the Community, had the ultimate effect of 
depriving the petitioner of the freedom to pursue its trade and occupation as guaranteed by Grundgesetz 
art. 12(1) (W. Ger.). Solange II, supra note I, at 361. Beyond these substantive constitutional violations, 
the petitioner alleged that procedural aspects of the decisions in the European Court and, derivatively, 
in the Federal Administrative Court had infringed on other protections afforded by the Basic Law. 
The European Court had, petitioner claimed, relied on improper evidence in its proceedings and 
ignored the facts presented there on petitioner'S behalf. See supra notes 73, 74 and 77, and accom-
panying text. Petitioner had thus been deprived of its constitutional guarantee of the right to be heard 
grounded in Grundgesetz arts. 19(4) & 103(1) (W. Ger.). In addition, the Federal Administrative Court 
was said to have negated the constitutionality assured access to a lawful judge rooted in Grundgesetz 
art. 101(1) (W. Ger.) when it adopted the findings offact improperly made by the European Court of 
Justice. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The decision of the Federal Administrative Court 
neither to refer the case to the Constitutional Court nor to resubmit it to the Court of Justice was also 
alleged to be a denial of the right to a lawful judge. See Solange II, supra note I, at 351; see also infra 
note 84. 
8. This result flowed from the fact, petitioner asserted, that the Federal Administrative Court "based 
its decision [solely] on the preliminary ruling of the European Court" and refused to avail itself of 
additional guidance from the Federal Constitutional Court under the authority of Grundgesetz art. 
100(1) (W. Ger.), mandating presentation to the Constitutional Court of issues within its jurisdiction 
appearing in other German courts (see supra note 24), or from the European Court under the provisions 
of EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177 (see supra note 16). Solange II, supra note I, at 354. 
85 The Constitutional Court concluded: "The European Court is a lawful adjudicator within the 
meaning of Article 101, § I, Sentence 2, of the Basic Law; this question, until now undecided by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, ... must receive an affirmative answer." Solange II, supra note I, at 366-
67. As a consequence, the procedural duty originating in the first Solange opinion 110 longer obligates 
lower German courts to refer cases to the Constitutional Court after a preliminary ruling by the 
European Court of Justice, even where basic constitutional rights are purportedly infringed by Com-
munity secondary law. Being a lawful adjudicator in the sense of the Grundgesetz, the European Court 
has the authority under the EEC Treaty to make final decisions (abschliessende Entscheidungsbefilgnis) 
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This dramatic volte-face by the Constitutional Court was prompted by perva-
sive developments throughout the whole structure of the European Commu-
nities. These developments, in the aggregate, placed beyond any cavil the com-
mitment in the Communities to the rule of law, the realization of democratic 
principles, and the thoroughgoing protection of fundamental human rights. 
The Constitutional Court was persuaded to reach this conclusion, in the first 
instance, by concrete developments with respect to the European Court itself; 
these considerations were reinforced by convincing evidence of a general ac-
ceptance of democratic ideals and recognition of fundamental rights by all arms 
of the Community. 
G. The European Court and Fundamental Rights 
"In view of the extensive institutional guarantees" by which it is bound, 
observed the Constitutional Court, "there can no longer be any doubt about the 
adjudicative quality of the Court of the European Communities."s6 These as-
surances were found in the conditions of the European Court's organization 
and function set forth in the Treaty itself;87 the obligations of impartiality, 
independence, integrity, and discretion binding its individual judges, together 
with its fixed procedural standards as expressed in the Protocol on the Statute 
of the Court;88 and in the norms established by the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of the European Economic Community.s9 The aggregate impact of these 
within its assigned competence. [d. at 368. This ruling did not, however, negate the right of a German 
citizen to bring an independent constitutional complaint with respect to such issues where all other 
prerequisites of a Verfassungsbeschwerde are met. In that regard, the Constitutional Court found that 
the petitioner's complaint was admissible (zuliissig), but nonetheless without merit (nicht begruruiet). !d. 
at 366. 
86 [d. at 367. 
87 [d. The EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 165-168 establishes the cadre of the Court of the 
Communities. Article 165 provides for the appointment of judges, article 166 establishes the office of 
the Advocates-General as assistants to the court; and article 168 permits the court to appoint its own 
Registrar. Moreover, article 188 provides that "[t]he Court of Justice shall adopt its [own] rules of 
procedure," subject only to unanimous Council approval. 
88 The Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, March 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 147 (1958) (annexed to the EEC Treaty, supra note 3), reprinted in 3 Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 4731, is the effective constitution of that court. The Constitutional Court in Sotange 
II was especially swayed by the provisions of the Protocol relating to the judiciary of the court (see 
articles 2-4 binding the judges to the conscientious and impartial discharge of these duties; article 3, 
concerning judicial immunities; and article 4 regarding conflicts of interest) and by those provisions 
establishing standards of procedural due process (see article 17 on the right to counsel; articles 18 and 
20 for notice requirements; articles 23-27 addressing the use of witnesses before the court; and article 
28 which, as a general matter, requires that all hearings before the court be public). Sotange II, supra 
note 1, at 367. 
89 Sotange II, supra note I, at 367. The Codified Versions of the Rules of Procedure, the Supple-
mentary Rules and the Instructions to the Registrar appear in 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) I (1982) 
(Information of the Court of Justice), reprinted in 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 4750. A range of 
considerations touching upon the structure, organization and function of the European Court are 
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mandatory standards weighed in favor of the recognition of the European Court 
as a "lawful judge" within the meaning of the German Basic Law: 
The [European] Court [of Justice] is a sovereign judicial adminis-
trative organ established by the Community treaties; judicially in-
dependent, it makes fundamental and final decisions on the basis 
and within the framework of normatively established competencies 
and proceedings pursuant to legal standards and judicial norms. Its 
members are obligated to independence and non-partisanship; their 
legal positions are normatively so organized that they assure per-
sonal independence. The court's procedure satisfies the constitu-
tional requirement of due process; it assures particularly the right 
to be heard, procedural challenge and defense opportunities ap-
propriate to the subject of the proceedings, as well as freely chosen, 
competent counsel .... 90 
The European Court's rulings have recognized and applied constitutional 
principles such as proportionality and the prohibition against excessiveness;91 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy;92 and the consti-
tutional duty to give an opinion in individual decisions.93 Thejudicial protection 
of personal rights had been added to the catalog of rights guaranteed by 
Community law through a ruling of the court.94 The court acknowledged the 
determined by the Rules. On the procedure of the court, see generally LAsOK, supra note 75. Of special 
note in the present context are the privileges and immunities of counsel (articles 32-36); entitlement 
to service of applications (article 39); rights of defense (articles 40-44); and provisions for legal aid to 
parties unable to meet the costs of proceeding before the court (article 76). 
90 Solange II, supra note I, at 367. 
91 Id. at 380-81 (citing Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1125, II Common 
Mkt. L.R. 255 (1972); Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 29 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 42 (1980); Testa, et. al. v. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1979; 
National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 2033, 29 Common Mkt. L.R. 169 (1980); Public Prosecutor v. Albert Heijn B.V., 1984 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 3263 (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,120; Robert Fearon 
& Company Limited v. The Irish Land Commission of the European Communities, 1984 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 3677, 43 Common Mkt. L.R. 228 (1985); Procureur de la Republique v. Association de 
Defense des Bruleurs d'Huiles Usagees, 1985 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 531, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,164). 
92 Solange II, supra note I, at 381 (citing Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 69; Regina v. Kent Kirk, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2689,41 Common Mkt. L.R. 522 (1984); 
Boehringer Mannheim G.m.b.H. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 1281, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 864 (1973». 
9' Solange II, supra note I, at 381 (citing Intermills, S.A. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3809, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,154; 
Netherlands v. Commission of the European Communities, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 809, (1983-
1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,170). 
94 Solange II, supra note I, at 381 (citing Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabuiary, 
1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. _, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,304). 
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right to be heard as an essential requirement for a fair trial. 95 Other rights 
incorporated by the court in its expanding jurisprudence include freedom of 
association, the general principle of equality before the law, the prohibition of 
arbitrariness, freedom of religion, and protection of the family.96 Fundamental 
liberties pertaining to economic activity, such as property rights and freedom 
in questions of employment, now appear on the roster of basic guarantees 
acknowledged in the European Court's decisions.97 Of particular importance to 
the Constitutional Court was the fact that many of these rights were recognized 
by the Court of Justice in reliance on the European Convention on Human 
Rights and through recourse to common constitutional traditions among the 
states of the Community.98 
95 Solange II, supra note 1, at 381 (citing Pecastaing v. The Belgian State, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
691, 29 Common Mkt. L.R. 685 (1980); National Panasonic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033, 29 
Common Mkt. L.R. 169 (1980». 
96 Solange II, supra note 1, at 380 (citing Union Syndicale, et. al. v. Council of the European Com-
munities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 917, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. 131 (1975); Albert Ruckdeschel & 
Col, et. al. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1753,25 Common Mkt. 
L.R. 445 (1979); Biovilac S.A. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 4057, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,150; Finsider v. Commission 
of the European Communities, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131; Sektkellerei C.A. Kupferberg & Cie 
KG a.A. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 157,48 Common Mkt. L.R. 36 (1987); 
Samara v. Commission of the European Communities, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 189; Michel v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 347; Defrenne v. Societe 
Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 
312 (1978); Prais v. Commission of the European Communities, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1589; 
Diatta v. Land Berlin, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 567, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,169). 
97 Solange II, supra note 1, at 380 (citing Firma J. Nold KG v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 338 (1974); Hauer, 1979 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 29 Common Mkt. L.R. 42 (1980); Agricola Commerciale Olio S.r.L. v. Commission 
of the European Communities, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3881, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,148; SAVMA S. p.A. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3915, (1983-1985 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,149). 
The rights acknowledged in these cases, the court noted, were in addition to the "express guarantees 
of liberty stated in the Community treaties themselves," in particular the prohibition against discrim-
ination on grounds of nationality provided for generally in EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 7, and 
with respect to employment conditions (EEC Treaty, at art. 48), establishment (EEC Treaty, at art. 
52), the provision of services (EEC Treaty, at art. 59), and the movement of capital (EEC Treaty, at 
art 67). 
981n both Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 17 Common Mkt. 
L.R. 140 (1976) and Johnston, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. _, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,304, 
the European court relied on the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955) [hereinafter the European 
Convention on Human Rights] in fashioning individual rights within the context of Community law. 
Solange II, supra note 1, at 381. Similarly, the European Court resorted to "general principles of the 
legal order in the Community" to find fundamental rights in Nold, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 
14 Common Mkt. L.R. 338 (1974); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 
11 Common Mkt. L.R. 255 (1972); and Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, 9 
Common Mkt. L.R. 112 (1970). Solange II, supra note 1, at 379. 
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The list of basic rights recognized by the European Court is extensive, but 
the Constitutional Court conceded that every right guaranteed by the Basic Law 
had not been addressed by a ruling of the European Court and that the 
compilation of rights judicially recognized by the European Court might have 
a few "holes."99 This, in itself, was not determinative: 
Decisive, however, is the basic position which the Court has by now 
attained with regard to the Community's obligation to fundamental 
rights, the normative embodiment of fundamental rights in Com-
munity law, and its normative connection (as far as it extends) with 
the Member State constitutions and with the European Human 
Rights Convention, as well as the material relevance which the pro-
tection of fundamental rights has now gained in the Court's admin-
istration of justice. 100 
The quality of human rights protection afforded by the European Court is, 
therefore, to be regarded as the constitutional equivalent of the fundamental 
rights assured by the German Basic Law: 
On the basis of the current level of the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court, it is not to be expected that the normative intertwining 
of Community law with the Member States' constitutions will result 
in a lowering of the Community law fundamental rights protection 
standard which, according to the Basic Law, could no longer be 
referred to as a generally appropriate fundamental rights standard. 
On the one hand, the Court is not obligated to bring the legal 
principles of Community law down to the least demanding common 
denominator based on the comparison of all Member States, if such 
far reaching differences between the Member States' constitutions 
did not exist then or exist presently. It is rather to be expected that 
the Court will strive for the best possible upholding of a fundamen-
tal law principle within Community law. On the other hand, the 
normative reference to the European Human Rights Convention, 
with the present extensive decisional law by the European Court for 
Human Rights, guarantees a minimum standard of substantive fun-
damental rights protection which will essentially satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements of the Basic Law.]O] 
Another factor also compelled the recognition of the European Court as the 
lawful adjudicator of issues within its competence under the Treaty of Rome. 
99 Sotange II, supra note I, at 383. The Federal Constitutional Court attributes these lacunae to the 
fact that the European Court built its fundamental rights jurisprudence on a case.by-case basis in 
common law fashion, in contrast to the more comprehensive, civil-law approach appearing in the 
German Grundgesetz. [d. 
100 [d. 
101 !d. at 385-86. 
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As a practical matter, the Constitutional Court conceded that the "decision-
making monopoly" of the European Court under Article 177 of the Treaty had 
worked a "partial, functional integration of the European Court into the several 
jurisdictions of the Member States."102 Frequent resort by national tribunals to 
the European Court is an established fact; this empirical reality should be 
acknowledged through the formal recognition of that court as the lawful ad-
judicator-for purposes of national law---of matters now before it on a regular 
basis. 103 
H. The Community Commitment to Fundamental Rights 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is, of course, but one of 
the major organs established to achieve the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. 
Even though the commitment of that court to the protection of basic rights is 
firm, the Federal Constitutional Court could harbor understandable concern 
regarding the corresponding commitment of other principal Community agen-
cies such as the Council and the Commission. The Federal Constitutional Court 
noted, looking back, that such considerations had been paramount when it 
handed down its 1974 decision in Solange I: 
[IJn light of the state of integration prevailing at that time, the 
generally binding fundamental rights standard within the European 
Community did not yet demonstrate legal certainty .... The Com-
munity was still deprived of our direct democratically legitimated 
102 As a result of this integration of the European Court into national judicial systems: 
[i)t becomes evident that the legal orders of the Member States and that of the Community 
do not stand side by side, separate and isolated, but that they reference one another in myriad 
ways, are intertwined, and are open to reciprocal effects .... In the interest of the purpose 
of the Treaty with regard to integration, legal certainty, and the equal application of the law, 
the jurisdictional competency [of the European Court under the EEC Treaty, especially in 
article 177) assures the most uniform interpretation and application possible of Community 
law by all courts within the jurisdiction of the EEC Treaty .... 
/d. at 368. 
103 The "intertwining" of jurisdictions noted by the Constitutional Court is documented. During the 
period 1961-1981, the European Court handed down 949 preliminary rulings under the EEC Treaty, 
supra note 3, at art. 177. Of these, 369 were requested by national courts of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. From this group, 19 came from the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (Bundesgerichthof), 
19 from the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht), and 3 from the Federal Labor Court (Bundesar· 
beitsgericht). Sixty-one cases were referred to the European Court by the Federal Financial Court 
(Bundesjinanzhof), while the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) submitted ten 
matters for preliminary rulings. Significantly, lower courts in the Federal Republic had asked for 257 
rulings from the European Court during this period of time. See Appendix to Chapter 10, in BROWN 
& JACOBS, supra note 7, at 185, 186, 191. On the right of lower national courts to seek preliminary 
rulings under the EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 177, see Rheinmiihlen-Diisseldorf v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 33. The Constitutional Court's 
acknowledgment of the Court of Justice as a "lawful judge" within the sense of the Grundgesetz comes, 
then, as a recognition of these realities. 
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parliament, produced by general elections, possessing legislative 
power to which the appropriate legislative organs of the Community 
are politically completely responsible; it was conspicuously lacking 
a list of fundamental rights .... 104 
27 
Significant democratic developments within Community institutions had, in the 
meantime, occurred; conditions permitting a less qualified endorsement of the 
Community's character as a democratic institution sensitive to the protection of 
fundamental rights had now been realized: 
[T]here has meanwhile developed within the European Communi-
ties a standard for fundamental rights protection which in concep-
tion, content and effect is to be considered substantially equal to the 
fundamental rights standard found in the [German] Basic Law. All 
principal organs of the Community have since recognized in legally 
relevant form that in the exercise of their authority and in pursuit 
of the Community's goals they will allow themselves to be guided in 
their legal duty by respect for fundamental rights .... There is no 
substantial basis to conclude that the fundamental rights standard 
[now] obtained in Community law is not sufficiently secured but, 
rather, is of a transitory nature. I05 
The Community's recognition of the legal duty to adhere to basic rights was 
grounded in a series of events of an overtly political character. In 1977 the 
Council, Commission, and Parliament of the Community had adopted a Joint 
Declaration emphasizing the rule of law and respect for basic rights as corner-
stones of the Communities and assuring the future application of these ideals.106 
A year later, a Declaration on Democracy adopted by the European Council 
affirmed the Communities' obligation to democratic principles and the protec-
tion of human rights. lo7 Moreover, the Constitutional Court noted, each member 
104 Solange II, supra note I, at 376-77. 
105Id. at 378. 
106 See the Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, Council and Commission of April 5, 1977, 
providing: 
I. The European Parliament. the Council and the Commission stress the prime importance 
they attach to the protection of fundamental rights. as derived in particular from the consti-
tutions of the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
2. In the exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European Communities 
they respect and will continue to respect these rights. 
20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977). 
107 Statement of the European Council, adopted at Copenhagen, 7-8 Apr. 1978: 
The Heads of State and of Government confirm their will ... to ensure that the cherished 
values of their legal, political and moral order are respected and to safeguard the principles 
of representative democracy. of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human 
rights. 
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state of the Communities now had ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights. !Os 
1. The Impact of the Ruling 
Each of the principal arms of the European Economic Community-Court, 
Council, Commission, and Parliament-had, the court concluded in 1986, com-
mitted itself by solemn and binding measures to the observance of an intricate 
and interlocked network of human rights obligations. 109 Its review at the time 
of Solange II revealed a European synergy of fundamental rights guarantees-
some originating within the European Court and some external to it, but all 
regularly applied by the Court of Justice of the Communities: 
1) A mature body of case law protective of these values had developed in the 
European Court, drawing on national constitutions for inspiration and content; 
2) Each nation of the Community had submitted itself to the obligation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights; 
3) The European Council had bound itself to a standard of fundamental 
rights protection which explicitly absorbed the "constitutional structure of the 
state" in the protection of human rights; and 
The application of these principles implies a political system of pluralist democracy which 
guarantees both the free expression of opinions within the constitutional organization of 
powers and the procedures necessary for the protection of human rights. 
The heads of State and of Government associate themselves with the Joint Declaration [of 
the EEC] Assembly, the Council and the Commission whereby these institutions expressed 
their determination to respect fundamental rights in pursuing the aims of the Communities. 
They solemnly declare that the respect for a maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership of the European 
Communities. 
Commission of the European Communities, Bulletin of the European Communities, No.3, at 5,6 (1978). The 
statement, in its English version, speaks of "the free expression of opinions within the constitutional 
organization of powers." The German version, quoted by the court in Solange II, supra note I, at 383, 
refers to "the constitutional structure of the state lim konstitutionellen Aufbau des Staates]." Such reference 
to a human rights standard, binding on the Community but anchored in national constitutions, would 
also have appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
108 Solange II, supra note I, at 384. The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 98, 
entered into force on September 3, 1953, and now has been ratified by all member states of the 
European Communities. At the time of the decision in Solange I, France-alone among the members 
of the Community in 1974--had not ratified the Convention. The court in Solange II had conceptual 
difficulties with the fact that the European Communities, as an entity, were not party to the agreement. 
It was satisfied, however, by the "normative references" to the Convention made by the European 
Council, the Parliament, Commission and Council of the Communities (see supra notes 103-104), and 
the European Court's repeated reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Federal 
Constitutional Court concluded that these references 
[together) with the now extensive decisional law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
guarantee a minimum standard of substantive fundamental rights protection which will 
basically satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Basic Law. This fact is not altered 
because the Community as such is not a member of the European Human Rights Convention. 
Solange II, supra note I, at 385-86. 
109 Solange II, supra note I, at 383-84. 
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4) The Council, Commission and Parliament had united in recognizing Mem-
ber State constitutions as a derivative source of fundamental rights binding on 
the Community. 
All of these "acts of legally relevant significance," taken together, left no room 
for further question regarding the status and standing of the Community Court 
as an integral component of the German legal order within the framework of 
that court's functions under the Treaty of Rome. 
A minimalist view would suggest that the court in Solange II has retained and, 
by force of repetition, further strengthened the judicial postures of the early 
days of the Community emphasizing the separate and autonomous character 
of the national and Community legal orders. The Constitutional Court has now, 
so runs the argument, simply dissolved a nettlesome procedural block-an 
important one, to be sure, but one ultimately of the court's own creation-to 
the finality of the European Court's rulings; even this is limited only to prelim-
inary rulings in cases presenting a potential conflict between Community sec-
ondary law and the basic rights of the Grundgesetz. This narrow impact is itself 
conditional and could seemingly be revoked at a future time if the Constitutional 
Court should take a dimmer view of the protection of human rights by Com-
munity organs. 
A maximalist perspective emphasizes the progress towards European inte-
gration which the ruling represents. The Constitutional Court by its decision of 
October 22, 1986 has effectively knitted the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities into the judicial fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
has, in so doing, formally acknowledged an objective fact of modern European 
economic reality. To that extent, the decision is pregnant with portent for the 
future of Europe. Moreover, the decision stands as dear witness to the emer-
gence in Europe of a European synergy of human rights protection. In recog-
nizing this achievement, the court has contributed meaningfully to the sub-
stance, stability, and permanence of that synergy. In this light, Solange II will 
prove, in the long run, of far greater significance than barring the importation 
into Europe of another one thousand tons of Taiwanese canned mushrooms. 
